

JUDGMENT ENTERED JULY 17, 2020Nos. 19-5352, 19-5353, 19-5354

IN THE

**United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit**

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

ALEX M. AZAR II, in his official capacity as
Secretary of Health & Human Services,Defendant-Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Nos. 1:18-cv-02841-RMC, 1:19-cv-00132-RMC, 1:19-cv-1745-RMC
District Judge Rosemary M. Collyer

PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC

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GLOSSARY

CMS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services

OPPS Outpatient Prospective Payment System

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INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35 STATEMENT

This case presents several critical issues at—and beyond—the edges of *Chevron*. The panel decision sustained a draconian Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) rulemaking by granting the agency extraordinary deference that it neither sought nor earned. To reach this result, the panel gave the wrong answer to several important, recurring *Chevron* questions.

First, the panel improperly concluded that the *Chevron* framework applied at all. Reviewing a preclusion provision governing Medicare appeals, the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction because the Medicare statute did not unambiguously foreclose CMS’s use of its “methods” authority to impose the payment. But courts

are independently obligated to determine their own jurisdiction, and in doing so they must apply a strong presumption that Congress does not mean to restrict judicial review. No *Chevron* deference should be given to an agency's effort to restrict the courts' jurisdiction, even when jurisdictional and merits questions intertwine.

Second, even though the Government failed to meaningfully argue for *Chevron* deference, it got the benefit of *Chevron* deference anyway. That fails to respect the Executive Branch's policy choices—including the choice whether to rely on *Chevron*—contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority.

Third, even if *Chevron* applied and even if the statute were ambiguous, CMS failed to meaningfully engage with any such ambiguity during rulemaking, and thus never brought its expertise to bear on any ambiguity Congress left open. The panel's decision cannot be reconciled with *Prill v. NLRB*, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and *Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. FMCSA*, 471 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Fourth, the panel's decision sustains CMS's novel interpretation of Subsection (t)(2)(F) only by granting extraordinary deference to the agency's overt end-run around Congress's carefully considered funding choices. To the extent current precedent countenances that outcome, the time has come for this Court to reinvigorate its Article III exercise of judicial review under *Chevron*.

This case is not just important in the *Chevron* abstract. It is critically important in the here-and-now. It permits the Executive to unilaterally cut hundreds of millions of dollars from hospital outpatient clinics serving millions of patients across the country. Those deep cuts will be felt all the more now, as hospitals navigate the unprecedented challenges imposed by the pandemic.

The Court should grant rehearing.

BACKGROUND

CMS promulgated a rule claiming a newfound and expansive statutory power to make certain unilateral Medicare payment cuts to a subset of hospitals, the upshot of which is that payments for hospital outpatient clinics serving millions of patients have been reduced by more than \$700 million per year. *See* 83 Fed. Reg. 58,818, 59,009 (Nov. 21, 2018) (Final Rule). CMS rooted its authority in 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F)'s authorization to “*develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered [outpatient department] services.*” That discrete and limited authority cannot be squared with the statute-swallowing power CMS claims.

CMS reimburses hospitals for outpatient services provided under Medicare Part B through the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS), which sets pre-determined rates for specific services. *See id.* § 1395l(t); *Amgen Inc. v. Smith*, 357 F.3d 103, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To set and adjust the “amount of payment”

under the OPPTS, CMS must follow specific statutory requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(4); *see also, e.g., id.* § 1395l(t)(2)(B), (t)(2)(C), (t)(3)(D)–(E), (t)(4)(A). Relevant here, two types of requirements affect the “amount of payment,” each of which CMS must update annually. First are service-specific changes to “groups, the relative payment weights, and the wage and other adjustments” that must be collectively budget-neutral—meaning that while CMS may reduce the amount owed for a specific service, it must reallocate the amount of any such cut to other outpatient services paid under Part B. *See id.* § 1395l(t)(9)(A)–(B). Second is the across-the-board conversion factor, which accounts for inflation in the cost of medical services and can be adjusted to make *non*-budget-neutral cuts. The same conversion factor applies to all OPPTS payments; if CMS adjusts the conversion factor, it shrinks (or grows) total payments by a set percentage. CMS cannot adjust the conversion factor to selectively change the OPPTS payment rate for some services but not others.

Subsection (t)(2)(F)’s authorization to “develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered services” is effectuated by a corresponding adjustment to that generally applicable conversion factor. If CMS “determines under methodologies described in paragraph (2)(F) that the volume of services paid for under this subsection increased beyond amounts established

through those methodologies,” it “may appropriately adjust the update to the conversion factor otherwise applicable in a subsequent year.” *Id.* § 1395l(t)(9)(C).

The upshot of the statutory structure is clear: If CMS wants to reduce *overall* OPPS outlays, it must cut payments across the board by lowering the conversion factor. If CMS instead wants to reduce payments for specific services, it must do so budget-neutrally, by increasing payments for other services.

In the Final Rule, CMS claimed to discover a workaround. CMS explained that its authority “to develop a method” under Subsection (t)(2)(F) should be interpreted to permit service-specific cuts, and that the statute does not “explicitly require” them “to be budget neutral.” *See, e.g.*, 83 Fed. Reg. at 59,009, 59,013. CMS thus claimed the affirmative power to adopt service-specific cuts under Subsection (t)(2)(F), in *non*-budget-neutral fashion.

Hospitals and hospital associations challenged the rule, arguing that CMS exceeded its delegated authority by promulgating service-specific, non-budget-neutral payment cuts and failed to observe statutory distinctions between certain excepted and non-excepted healthcare entities. In consolidated proceedings, the District Court held that CMS had acted *ultra vires* in adopting its purported “method” under Subsection (t)(2)(F) and vacated the Final Rule in pertinent part. A panel of this Court reversed.

Reasoning that “HHS is generally entitled to *Chevron* deference on judicial review of its interpretations of the Medicare statute”—including Medicare’s judicial-review provision itself—the panel concluded that “Congress did not ‘unambiguously forbid’ ” CMS from “reduc[ing] the OPPS reimbursement for a specific service ... in a non-budget-neutral manner” under Subsection (t)(2)(F), and that CMS had “reasonably read subparagraph (2)(F) to allow a service-specific, non-budget-neutral reimbursement cut” under the circumstances. A14, A17 (citation omitted). The panel granted this extraordinary deference even though CMS never explained during rulemaking why it viewed Congress’s payment instructions to be ambiguous, and even though the Government only briefly alluded to *Chevron* in its briefing on appeal.

REASONS REHEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED

I. THE PANEL ERRED BY APPLYING *CHEVRON* TO A QUESTION OF THE COURT’S OWN JURISDICTION.

The panel correctly recognized that “the question whether the Hospitals are correct [on the merits] and the question whether the preclusion provision bars review of their claim are one and the same,” A13–14, given that the Medicare statute forecloses review only of those “methods” the statute authorizes CMS to adopt. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12)(A). Applying *Chevron*, the panel reasoned that the statute did not “unambiguously forbid” the agency’s use of its “methods” authority to impose non-budget-neutral payment cuts on the Hospitals, A17, and

accordingly concluded that judicial review of CMS's invocation of its "methods" authority was foreclosed, A26. This was error; the panel should not have permitted CMS to narrow the scope of the Court's jurisdiction.

Courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists," *Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.*, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), and the interpretation of jurisdictional statutes "is exclusively the province of the courts," *Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co. v. DOI*, 252 F.3d 473, 478, *opinion modified on denial of reh'g*, 270 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For this reason, both the Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly recognized that *Chevron* plays no role in courts' reading of jurisdictional provisions, even where the provision may otherwise implicate some features of agency expertise. "*Chevron* deference," after all, "is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.'" *Smith v. Berryhill*, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1778 (2019) (quoting *King v. Burwell*, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015)). "The scope of judicial review, meanwhile, is hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress implicitly delegated to an agency." *Id.* See also *Kisor v. Wilkie*, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019) (*Chevron* does not apply "when an agency interprets a judicial-review provision"); *NetCoalition v. SEC*, 715 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2013); *Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.*, 252 F.3d at 478.

This principle applies with special force where jurisdiction turns, as here, on a preclusion-of-review provision. There is a “particularly strong” presumption “that Congress intends judicial review of agency action taken in excess of delegated authority.” *Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 111. As both the Supreme Court and this Court (in a panel opinion interpreting the same Medicare statute at issue here) have recently re-affirmed, this presumption may be overcome only by “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress intended to preclude a suit. *AHA v. Azar*, 967 F.3d 818, 824 (D.C. Cir. 2020); *see also Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr*, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020).

Given this presumption, *Chevron* does not affect how courts read preclusion-of-review provisions. Deference to an agency’s views comes into play under *Chevron* only after the court first “exhaust[s] all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” and finds that “the legal toolkit is empty.” *Kisor*, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). Canons of statutory construction form an essential part of that legal toolkit, and accordingly “[w]here, as here, the canons supply an answer, *Chevron* leaves the stage.” *Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis*, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (quotation marks omitted). The canon that preclusion-of-review statutes are to be narrowly construed controls this case; any statutory ambiguity must be resolved in favor of jurisdiction, leaving no role for the agency’s views. *See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC*, 280 F.3d

1027, 1038–39, *opinion modified on reh’g*, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to defer to agency construction that statute precluded review).

The panel reasoned that these principles do not apply when “consideration of the agency’s statutory authority merges with ... consideration of the applicability of a preclusion provision.” A16. It asserted that a failure to apply *Chevron* “would mean that Congress’s decision to enact a preclusion provision operated to enhance judicial scrutiny and restrict the agency’s leeway.” *Id.* But it is not difficult to imagine why Congress—legislating against the presumption that it must speak clearly if it means to restrict the courts’ jurisdiction—would have intended precisely this result. Congress granted CMS broad, and unreviewable, authority to develop “methods” to control unnecessary increases in the volume of outpatient services. And Congress could anticipate that CMS might attempt to apply that authority in ways that would undermine other statutory commands. It stands to reason that Congress would have intended the courts first to determine “with clear and convincing evidence” whether CMS genuinely has that authority before permitting the agency to exercise such power. After all, “*Chevron* deference is available only when an agency interprets a statutory provision that Congress has charged it with administering through application of its expertise” and “statutory provisions addressing the jurisdiction of federal courts do not fit that mold.” *Allegheny Def. Project v. FERC*, 964 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc).

When the statute is read independently by the court, applying the presumption in favor of judicial review, CMS's rule cannot be sustained. The statute specifies that the "amount of payment" for any particular outpatient service "is determined" by a detailed formula. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(4). Under that formula, payment rates for particular services may be "adjusted," so long as CMS does so in a budget-neutral manner. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(4)(A) (cross-referencing paragraphs (t)(2)(D) and (E)). CMS's "methods" authority plays no role in the setting of particular payment rates under this formula; it comes into the picture only when the agency sets the across-the-board conversion factor.

Applying *Chevron*, the panel determined that it was at least reasonable for CMS to conclude that it wasn't bound by the statutory formula Congress established in paragraph (t)(4), because other provisions of the statute set forth alternative instructions to calculate payments for particular kinds of outpatient services. A23. But as this Court recently recognized, these other provisions "operate[] as a standalone payment regime" that do not depend on the baseline statutory formula for outpatient payments. *AHA*, 967 F.3d at 827. In contrast, in cases (like this one) where Congress has not amended the statute to add a standalone payment regime for a particular type of outpatient service but, instead, expressly commanded CMS to continue to apply the baseline statutory payment formula, CMS "must use" the "general methodology" of the statute "to set standard

OPPS payments.” *Id.* at 824. At a minimum, there is not “clear and convincing evidence” to the contrary, and this Court should apply the presumption in favor of judicial review to hold that CMS may not invoke its “methods” authority to disregard the statutory payment formula.

II. THE PANEL ERRED BY APPLYING *CHEVRON* WHEN THE GOVERNMENT FORFEITED THAT ARGUMENT.

The panel should not have deferred to CMS’s interpretation of Subsection (t)(2)(F). Because the Government’s briefing only gestured at *Chevron*’s application, it forfeited any claim to deference. Just as courts may credit the Executive’s policy choice to invoke delegated authority, courts should respect the decision *not* to rely on such authority. Agencies gain and lose deference based on their policy choices—including through established principles of waiver and forfeiture.

Decades of Supreme Court precedents confirm as much. *See, e.g., County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund*, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020) (applying *Skidmore* deference when “[n]either the Solicitor General nor any party has asked us to give what the Court has referred to as *Chevron* deference”); *see also Guedes v. ATF*, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This Court has often declined to apply *Chevron* deference when the government fails to invoke it.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court “does *not* apply the *Chevron* framework in nearly three-quarters of the cases where it would appear applicable under

Mead.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, *The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan*, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121–25 (2008) (collecting cases). That is because many of the parties in those cases declined to affirmatively brief *Chevron*. See generally Natalie Salmanowitz & Holger Spamann, *Does the Supreme Court Really Not Apply Chevron When it Should?*, 57 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 81, 83 (2019) (in 104 out of the 191 cases Eskridge and Baer surveyed, “neither party to the litigation nor the [Solicitor General] as amicus even invoked *Chevron* deference in their briefs”); but see, e.g., *Pereira v. Sessions*, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court, for whatever reason, is simply ignoring *Chevron*.”).

The overwhelming weight of case law bears out the implicit logic of that practice: *Chevron* deference is subject to normal waiver and forfeiture rules. See, e.g., *Hays Med. Ctr. v. Azar*, 956 F.3d 1247, 1264 n.18 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Secretary’s perfunctory and fleeting invocation of *Chevron* waives his argument for *Chevron* deference.”); *State v. DOJ*, 951 F.3d 84, 101 n.17 (2d Cir. 2020) (because “[d]efendants have not claimed *Chevron* deference for their own interpretation,” “we do not consider whether any such deference might be warranted”); *CFTC v. Erskine*, 512 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he CFTC waived any reliance on *Chevron* deference by failing to raise it to the district

court.”); *Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.*, 332 F.3d 316, 319 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (“This [*Chevron*] argument was not presented to nor passed on by the district court, and therefore may not be considered on appeal.”).

This Court initially followed form with its sibling circuits. In *Neustar, Inc. v. FCC*, this Court held that the FCC had “forfeited any claims to *Chevron* deference” when its “brief nominally references *Chevron*’s deferential standard in its standard of review but did not invoke this standard with respect to rulemaking.” 857 F.3d 886, 893–894 (D.C. Cir. 2017); compare Gov. Br. 12, 17 (also nominally referencing *Chevron*). In *Global Tel*Link v. FCC*, facing an order the FCC no longer defended, the Court similarly reasoned that “it would make no sense for this court to determine whether the ... positions advanced in the Order warrant *Chevron* deference when the agency has abandoned those positions.” 866 F.3d 397, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2017); but see *id.* at 425 (Pillard, J., dissenting).

That line of authority took a turn, however, in *SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board*, 904 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2018). *SoundExchange* purported to distinguish *Neustar* and *Global Tel*Link* on the ground that even when the agency makes “no invocation of *Chevron* in the briefing in our court”—which would normally forfeit an argument—deference is still appropriate “if an agency manifests its engagement in the kind of interpretive exercise to which review under *Chevron* generally applies.” *Id.* at 54. This Court went one step

further in *Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives*, deferring to an agency interpretation where the agency had invoked and applied *Chevron* in its rulemaking, despite the Government “affirmatively disclaim[ing] any reliance on *Chevron*” in litigation. 920 F.3d 1, 21–22 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

The panel decision here further expands those precedents by applying *Chevron* when the agency failed to adequately preserve the argument on appeal and when its rulemaking conduct evinces no basis for deference. The Bureau in *Guedes* “expressly invok[ed] the *Chevron* framework and ... elaborat[ed] at length as to how *Chevron* applies to the Rule,” with “several paragraphs of analysis.” 920 F.3d at 18–19. The Board in *SoundExchange* “explicitly considered ‘the plain meaning of the statute, the clear statutory purpose, applicable prior decisions, and the relevant legislative history’ ” before concluding that its interpretation was “ ‘permissible, reasonable, and rational.’ ” 904 F.3d at 54–55 (internal citations to rulemaking). The Court will look in vain for any such exercise here. The panel’s expansive decision thus brings itself into direct conflict with *Neustar* and *Global Tel*Link*, and en banc review is warranted.

III. EVEN IF *CHEVRON* APPLIES AND EVEN IF THE STATUTE WERE AMBIGUOUS, THE PANEL ERRED BY PROCEEDING TO STEP 2.

Rehearing is also warranted because, even assuming *Chevron* applied and Subsection (t)(2)(F) were ambiguous, the panel erred by proceeding to Step Two

because “the agency itself” failed to “recognize[] that it was dealing with an ambiguous statute.” *See generally* Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, *Chevron Step One-and-a-Half*, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 757, 760 (2017).

This Court held in *Prill v. NLRB* that “an agency regulation must be declared invalid,” even if that regulation *could* have been properly adopted, “if it was not based on the agency’s own judgment but rather on the unjustified assumption that it was Congress’ judgment that such a regulation is desirable.” 755 F.2d 941, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cleaned up). That means “*Chevron* Step 2 deference is reserved for those instances when an agency *recognizes* that the Congress’s intent is not plain from the statute’s face.” *Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. FMCSA*, 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). Thus, to warrant deference, “it is incumbent upon the agency not to rest simply on its parsing of the statutory language—it must bring its experience and expertise to bear in light of competing interests at stake.” *Id.* (cleaned up) (quoting *PDK Labs, Inc. v. DEA*, 362 F.3d 786, 797–798 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

Nowhere in the rulemaking process did CMS either identify any relevant ambiguity in the statute or purport to bring its expertise to bear as to what should, as a policy matter informed by the agency’s technical knowledge and experience, constitute a “method.” To the extent the *panel* may have identified a lurking ambiguity, the proper course is to remand to CMS “to interpret the statutory

language anew.” *Peter Pan*, 471 F.3d at 1354; *Prill*, 755 F.2d at 956–957. The panel instead substituted its own interpretation for the agency’s. It reasoned that the “methods” authority extended far enough to permit CMS to cut payment rates to counter “unnecessary volume growth” caused by the agency’s “own reimbursement practices,” A25, a limitation that neither accurately describes this case (outpatient reimbursement rates are Congress’s, not the agency’s) nor was relied on by the agency in its own attempt to define the extent of its authority. *See Pierce v. SEC*, 786 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A reviewing court may not supply a reasoned basis for an agency action that the agency itself did not give in the record under review.”).

To be sure, a minority strain of this Court’s case law appears to be inconsistent with *Prill* and *Peter Pan*. *See, e.g., Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. FERC*, 667 F.3d 1284, 1288–89 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (suggesting that so “long as the text is ambiguous and the agency does not insist that it is clear, a reasonable interpretation will warrant our deference”); *see also* Hemel & Nielson, *Chevron Step One-and-a-Half*, *supra* at 817–818 (“Our modest suggestion is that the DC Circuit should clarify the ambiguity as to how it will treat ambiguity about ambiguity.”). En banc review is warranted to affirm that *Prill* and *Peter Pan* mean what they say, and that agencies should not be granted knee-jerk deference when they fail to bring their expertise to bear on recognized statutory ambiguity.

IV. *CHEVRON'S RECKONING HAS COME.*

“An Article III renaissance is emerging against the judicial abdication performed in *Chevron's* name.” *Waterkeeper All. v. EPA*, 853 F.3d 527, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring); *see also, e.g., PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc.*, 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2057 (2019) (Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., concurring) (emphasizing the “need to reconsider” *Chevron*). While *Chevron* has long been a topic of fierce debate, there is a growing chorus calling for reform. *See generally* Christopher J. Walker, *Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review*, 16 *Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y* 103 (2018).

The panel's decision is another data point showing that the prevailing *Chevron* approach should be clarified and narrowed, if not overruled outright. It is no secret that deciding how and whether to apply *Chevron* is frequently, as here, outcome-determinative. *See* Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, *Chevron in the Circuit Courts*, 116 *Mich. L. Rev.* 1, 30–32 (2017) (noting that agencies win 77.4% of the time under *Chevron*). “[T]he time has come to face the behemoth.” *Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch*, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). While it is up to the Supreme Court to decide whether to overrule *Chevron*, this Court can and should revisit its interpretive framework to clarify that *Chevron* Step One is not just a crack in the sidewalk. It is an actual Step. And Step Two is not infinitely capacious. A more rigorous framework fulfills the

courts’ “emphatic[.]” constitutional role to “say what the law is”—including “expound[ing] and interpret[ing]” the application of general rules to particular cases. *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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August 31, 2020

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. This petition complies with the type-volume limitations of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(b)(2) and 40(b), because excluding the parts of the document exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(f), this document contains 3,880 words.

2. This petition complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14-point Times New Roman.

/s/ Catherine E. Stetson
Catherine E. Stetson

ADDENDUM

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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 17, 2020

Decided July 17, 2020

No. 19-5352

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL.,
APPELLEES

v.

ALEX M. AZAR, II, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
APPELLANT

Consolidated with 19-5353, 19-5354

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:18-cv-02841)
(No. 1:19-cv-00132)
(No. 1:19-cv-01745)

Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were *Mark B. Stern*, Attorney, *Robert P. Charrow*, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, *Janice L. Hoffman*, Associate General Counsel, *Susan Maxson Lyons*, Deputy Associate General Counsel for Litigation, and *Robert W. Balderston*, Attorney.

Howard R. Rubin and *Robert T. Smith* were on the brief for amici curiae Digestive Health Physicians Association, et al. in support of appellant.

Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were *Susan M. Cook*, *Katherine B. Wellington*, *Mark D. Polston*, *Joel McElvain*, *Christopher P. Kenny*, and *Michael LaBattaglia*. *Kyle Druding* entered an appearance.

Before: SRINIVASAN, *Chief Judge*, GARLAND and MILLETT, *Circuit Judges*.

Opinion for the Court filed by *Chief Judge* SRINIVASAN.

SRINIVASAN, *Chief Judge*: Many hospitals provide outpatient care at off-site facilities known as “off-campus provider-based departments,” or PBDs. Certain services offered by hospitals at off-campus PBDs, such as routine clinic visits, can also be provided by independent physician practices unaffiliated with a hospital. Although off-campus PBDs and independent physician practices can offer the same service, Medicare until recently reimbursed those providers at different rates: because off-campus PBDs are considered hospitals for regulatory purposes, they were paid a higher rate applicable to hospitals instead of a lower rate applicable to physician practices. The result was that, for the same outpatient service, off-campus PBDs obtained up to twice as much per patient in Medicare reimbursements as did physician practices.

The Department of Health and Human Services determined that the payment differential gave rise to an economic incentive that induced unnecessary growth in the volume of outpatient care provided at off-campus PBDs. HHS thus reduced the rate it paid hospitals for the most common off-campus PBD service, “patient evaluation and management,” to

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equal the rate paid to physician practices for that service. HHS justified that reimbursement cut as an exercise of its statutory authority to adopt “method[s] for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume” of covered outpatient services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F).

A group of hospitals brought these consolidated actions, claiming that HHS’s rate reduction for off-campus PBDs falls outside of the agency’s statutory authority. The district court agreed and set aside the regulation implementing the rate reduction. Because we conclude that the regulation rests on a reasonable interpretation of HHS’s statutory authority to adopt volume-control methods, we now reverse.

I.

A.

Medicare Part B health insurance covers outpatient hospital care, including same-day surgery, preventive and screening services, and physician visits. *See* 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j, 1395k. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) sets the rates at which Medicare will reimburse hospitals for providing such services according to an intricate statutory system known as the Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS). *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t).

Under the OPPS, hospitals are not reimbursed for the actual costs incurred in providing care. Instead, to help control Medicare expenditures, the statute calls for HHS to set predetermined payment amounts for each covered outpatient service. *See* H.R. Rep. No. 106-436, at 33 (1999). Hospitals then receive that amount for every instance in which they provide the service. OPPS rates are revised each year via notice-and-comment rulemaking and are published before they

go into effect. *See Amgen, Inc. v. Smith*, 357 F.3d 103, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

HHS generally sets the rates using a complex statutory formula. First, each covered outpatient service (or group of related services) is assigned an Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC). 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(B). HHS then establishes “relative payment weights” for each APC based on the median cost of providing the relevant services. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(2)(C). In that relative weighting process, HHS may decide, for instance, that given the cost to the hospital, a certain service should be reimbursed at twice the rate of a different service. Next, each APC’s relative weight is multiplied by a number known as the “conversion factor.” *Id.* § 1395l(t)(3)(D). The same conversion factor applies to all APCs. *Id.* Multiplying an APC’s relative payment weight by the conversion factor produces a dollar amount, which is the base “fee schedule amount” for that APC. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(4)(A). That amount is subject to a variety of possible further adjustments, such as adjustments reflecting regional wage differences, *id.* § 1395l(t)(4)(A), or “outlier adjustments” for hospitals facing unusually high operating costs, *id.* § 1395l(t)(5).

When setting rates each year, HHS is required to reassess its choices: what services or groups of services should make up each APC, what an APC’s relative payment weight should be, and what statutory adjustments (such as for labor cost differences) should be applied. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(9)(A). Changes to any of those inputs will alter the payment rate for a particular service. Any change HHS makes in those respects, however, must not cause overall projected expenditures for the next year to increase or decrease. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(9)(B). Under this “budget-neutrality” requirement, an increase or decrease in projected spending must be offset by other changes.

HHS must also update the conversion factor each year in order to keep up with inflation in general health care costs. *Id.* § 1395l(t)(3)(C)(ii), (t)(3)(C)(iv). Increases to the conversion factor, of course, proportionately increase overall OPPS outlays. But adjustments to the conversion factor need not be implemented in a budget-neutral manner—indeed, it would make little sense to do so in light of the objective of keeping pace with inflation.

The OPPS is designed to advance Congress’s goal of controlling Medicare Part B costs in two ways. First, the OPPS encourages hospital efficiency by setting payment rates prospectively and basing the amount on median cost. Second, because of the budget-neutrality requirement, overall OPPS expenditure growth should closely track annual increases to the conversion factor. Those increases are modest and their amount is prescribed by statute.

Although HHS has significant control over the rate it will pay hospitals for a specific service under the OPPS system, the agency has little control over how frequently hospitals will provide that service. Consequently, even if payment rates remain constant, an increase in the amount of services provided will cause an increase in overall Medicare expenditures.

Congress addressed that possibility in subparagraph (2)(F) of the OPPS statute, the provision centrally in issue in this case. Subparagraph (2)(F) directs HHS to “develop a method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered [outpatient] services.” *Id.* § 1395l(t)(2)(F). Relatedly, Congress also authorized HHS to reduce the conversion factor, thereby shrinking projected overall expenditures, if it “determines under methodologies described in [sub]paragraph (2)(F) that the volume of services paid for . . . increased beyond

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amounts established through those methodologies.” *Id.* § 1395l(t)(9)(C).

B.

Some hospitals provide outpatient care at facilities known as off-campus provider-based departments (PBDs), which are located away from the physical site of the hospital. Off-campus PBDs are considered part of the hospital for regulatory purposes. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 413.65. For that reason, services provided at off-campus PBDs are reimbursed through the OPSS system. HHS thus has generally paid hospitals the same amount for outpatient care provided at an off-campus PBD as for outpatient care provided in the main hospital.

At least some services provided at off-campus PBDs can also be provided by freestanding physician offices, i.e., medical practices unaffiliated with a hospital. Physician offices are generally reimbursed at a lower rate for a given service than hospitals, because hospitals receive a separate “facility” rate inapplicable to freestanding physician practices. *See* Medicare Program: Proposed Changes to Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,046, 37,142 (July 31, 2018).

Consider the amounts Medicare paid for a service commonly provided by off-campus PBDs: “evaluation and management of a patient,” or E&M. In 2017, the E&M reimbursement rate for off-campus PBDs under the OPSS was \$184.44 for new patients and \$158.24 for established patients. By contrast, the 2017 E&M rate for freestanding physician offices—paid under a separate system known as the Physician Fee Schedule—was \$109.46 for new patients and \$73.93 for established patients. *See id.* Hospital-affiliated outpatient

departments thus received between 68% and 114% more in reimbursements per patient for the same service.

According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), which was established by Congress to advise HHS, *see* Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4022, 111 Stat. 251, 350, hospitals reacted to the incentive created by the payment differential between off-campus PBDs and independent physician practices. Almost a decade ago, hospitals began buying freestanding physician practices and converting them into off-campus PBDs, without much change in the facility or the patients served. MedPAC, *Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy* 53, 59–61, 75–76 (Mar. 2014), <https://go.usa.gov/xdCzV>. MedPAC documented substantial increases in the provision of E&M services at hospital outpatient departments and little to no growth in the provision of the same services at physician offices. *See id.* at 42. From 2011 to 2016, the provision of E&M services at off-campus PBDs grew by 43.8%. MedPAC, *Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy* 73 (2018), <https://go.usa.gov/xdCzu>. By comparison, the provision of E&M services at freestanding physician practices grew by only 0.4%. *Id.*

In 2015, Congress attempted to address the substantial growth in services provided at off-campus PBDs by enacting section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584, 597–98 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13951(t)(21)). Section 603 adopted something of a compromise approach. On one hand, it did not touch the reimbursement rates for existing off-campus PBDs. On the other hand, it established that off-campus PBDs coming into existence after the statute’s enactment would no longer be paid under the OPPI, but instead would be paid under the “applicable payment system under this part,” which HHS interpreted to be a rate equivalent to the Physician Fee

Schedule. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(21)(C). That change applied to every service—not just E&M services—provided at new off-campus PBDs.

After section 603’s enactment, though, HHS still continued to observe steady growth in the volume of hospital outpatient services. 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,139. For the years 2016 through 2018, the volume and intensity of services grew annually by 6.5%, 5.8%, and 5.4%, respectively. *Id.* And in its proposed OPPS rule setting rates for 2019, the agency projected that, without changes, volume would again increase by 5.3% in that year, leading to \$75.3 billion in overall OPPS expenditures. *Id.* Outlays had been nearly \$20 billion less only a few years earlier. *Id.*

HHS determined that, despite the 2015 enactment of section 603, “the differences in payment for . . . services” continued to be “a significant factor in the shift in services from the physician’s office to the hospital outpatient department, . . . unnecessarily increasing hospital outpatient department volume.” *Id.* at 37,142. HHS believed that the “higher payment that is made under the OPPS, as compared to payment under the [Physician Fee Schedule], [was] likely to be incentivizing providers to furnish care in the hospital outpatient setting.” *Id.* at 37,141. Thus, although section 603 had removed the incentive for hospitals to purchase physician practices and convert them into off-campus PBDs on a going-forward basis, the statute did not remove the incentive to provide care in off-campus PBDs already in existence.

In its rule proposing 2019 OPPS rates, HHS announced that it “consider[ed] the shift of services” it had observed to be “unnecessary if the beneficiary can safely receive the same services in a lower cost setting but is instead receiving services in the higher paid setting due to payment incentives.” *Id.* at

37,142. The agency concluded that E&M services, which are routine clinic visits, fit the bill, and thus that “the growth in clinic visits paid under the OPSS is unnecessary.” *Id.*

Having found an “unnecessary increase[] in the volume of covered [outpatient] services,” HHS proposed to exercise its subparagraph (2)(F) authority to “develop a method for controlling” the increase. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F); 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,142. Specifically, the agency proposed to cut E&M reimbursement rates to off-campus PBDs to the amount HHS pays to freestanding physician offices for providing the same service. “[C]apping the OPSS payment at the [Physician Fee Schedule]-equivalent rate,” the agency explained, “would be an effective method to control the volume of these unnecessary services because the payment differential that is driving the site-of-service decision [would] be removed.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,142.

Notably, HHS proposed to implement the E&M reimbursement cut in a non-budget-neutral manner. In other words, the agency would reduce payments without offsetting increases in reimbursements for other covered outpatient services. *Id.* at 37,142–43. Although the OPSS statute generally requires annual rate adjustments to be budget-neutral, *see* 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(9)(B), the agency did not believe that requirement applied to methods for controlling volume under subparagraph (2)(F). 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,142–43. HHS chose not to apply the reimbursement cut in a budget-neutral manner because doing so “would not appropriately reduce the overall unnecessary volume of covered [outpatient] services, and instead would simply shift the movement of the volume within the OPSS system in the aggregate.” *Id.* at 37,143. HHS estimated that the proposed rule would reduce Medicare’s expenditures by approximately \$610 million in 2019 alone,

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with an additional \$150 million saved by Medicare beneficiaries in the form of reduced coinsurance payments. *Id.*

After receiving comments, the agency adopted its proposal as a final rule, with the only change that the E&M reimbursement cut would be phased in over two years. *See Medicare Program: Changes to Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs*, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,818, 59,004–15 (Nov. 21, 2018).

C.

The American Hospital Association and various hospitals (whom we will refer to collectively as the Hospitals) challenged the 2019 rule in these actions, which were consolidated in the district court for purposes of addressing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. *See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Azar*, 410 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.D.C. 2019). The Hospitals first argued that HHS's reduction in reimbursement for E&M services exceeded the agency's statutory authority because the reduction does not qualify as a "method for controlling unnecessary increases in . . . volume" under subparagraph (2)(F) of the OPPI statute. *See id.* at 150–51. The Hospitals also argued that HHS's decision to cut reimbursement to preexisting off-campus PBDs contravened Congress's decision to leave preexisting facilities unaddressed in section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. *See id.*

The district court agreed with the Hospitals' first argument. *Id.* at 161. The court accordingly vacated as *ultra vires* the part of the challenged rule that reduced E&M reimbursement rates. *Id.* This appeal followed.

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II.

We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Hospitals' claim. Subparagraph (12)(A) of the OPPS statute provides that "[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review of" certain specified actions HHS takes in implementing the OPPS, including "the establishment of . . . methods described in paragraph (2)(F)." 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12)(A). The government contends that HHS's cut to E&M reimbursement qualifies as such a "method." Thus, the government argues, judicial review of that reimbursement cut is precluded by statute, and we should dispose of the case on that basis at the threshold without examining HHS's authority to implement the rate reduction.

We are unpersuaded. Although subparagraph (12)(A) forecloses judicial review of the agency's "establishment of methods described in paragraph (2)(F)," the Hospitals' claim is that the payment reduction at issue is *not* a "method[]" described in paragraph (2)(F)" within the meaning of the statute. As a result, to determine whether the judicial-review bar applies in this case, we must decide whether the challenged agency action counts as a "method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered [outpatient] services." *Id.* § 1395l(t)(2)(F). And that latter question is the merits issue presented here.

Subparagraph (12)(A) therefore is a preclusion-of-review provision that "merges consideration of the legality of [agency] action with consideration of the court's jurisdiction in cases in which the challenge to the [agency's] action raises the question of the [agency's statutory] authority." *Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 113–14 (quoting *COMSAT Corp. v. FCC*, 114 F.3d 223, 226–27 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). In such cases, if the court "find[s] that [the agency] has acted outside the scope of its statutory

mandate, we also find that we have jurisdiction.” *COMSAT*, 114 F.3d at 227. Put differently, “the jurisdiction-stripping provision does not apply” if the agency’s action fails to qualify as the kind of action for which review is barred. *Southwest Airlines Co. v. TSA*, 554 F.3d 1065, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2009). As a practical matter, then, the court can simply skip to the merits question in its analysis. *See, e.g., id.; Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 114; *COMSAT*, 114 F.3d at 227.

This court has already construed the provision at issue here as “merging” the preclusion and merits analysis in that way. In *Amgen*, we stated that subparagraph (12)(A)’s preclusion on review of “other adjustments” to rates by HHS “extends no further than the Secretary’s statutory authority to make” such adjustments. 357 F.3d at 112. Accordingly, we concluded that subparagraph (12)(A) “precludes judicial review of any adjustment made by the Secretary pursuant to [his statutory] authority . . . but not of those for which such authority is lacking.” *Id.* at 113. We then proceeded to the merits question, ultimately holding that the challenged adjustment was within the agency’s statutory authority and that we thus lacked jurisdiction. *Id.* at 114, 118. The government contends that *Amgen*’s treatment of subparagraph (12)(A) was dicta, but regardless, we fully agree with *Amgen*’s approach, under which we analyze the merits to decide whether we have jurisdiction.

The government attempts to sidestep that result by pressing us to analyze the Hospitals’ claim under the ‘*ultra vires* review’ doctrine often attributed to *Leedom v. Kyne*, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). That doctrine, which we have likened to a “Hail Mary pass,” “permits, in certain limited circumstances, judicial review of agency action for alleged statutory violations even when a statute precludes review.” *Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors*, 589 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The government submits that the Hospitals’ challenge presents

such a circumstance and thus must satisfy the stringent requirements set out in *DCH Regional Medical Center v. Azar*, 925 F.3d 503, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2019)—among them, that the agency plainly acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific, clear, and mandatory prohibition in the statute. *Id.*

The Hospitals’ challenge does not implicate the *Kyne* framework. We are not asked to remedy a “statutory violation[] even when a statute precludes review.” *Nyunt*, 589 F.3d at 449. Instead, the Hospitals argue that the “same agency error . . . simultaneously ma[kes] the jurisdictional bar inapplicable and compel[s] setting aside the challenged agency action.” *DCH Regional*, 925 F.3d at 510 (quotation marks omitted). Put differently, the Hospitals’ claim is that subparagraph (12)(A)’s bar on judicial review does not apply if their merits argument is correct, not that their merits argument is so obviously correct that we should consider it despite an applicable bar on our review. *DCH Regional* itself recognized the distinction between cases involving a “*Kyne* exception” and cases such as this one in which “the relevant statutory bar . . . [is] effectively coextensive with the merits.” *Id.* at 509–10.

In sum, subparagraph (12)(A)’s bar on judicial review is inapplicable unless HHS’s challenged action qualifies as a “method for controlling unnecessary increases in . . . volume” under subparagraph (2)(F). Subparagraph (12)(A) then ultimately does not preclude judicial scrutiny of HHS’s action for consistency with subparagraph (2)(F). To be sure, subparagraph (12)(A) still forecloses inquiry into “whether [the] challenged agency decision is arbitrary, capricious, or procedurally defective.” *Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 113. But such claims are not before us here. As to the claim the Hospitals do raise, the question whether the Hospitals are correct and the

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question whether the preclusion provision bars review of their claim are one and the same. We thus turn to assessing whether HHS had statutory authority to implement the challenged E&M reimbursement reduction.

III.

A.

We examine that question under the traditional *Chevron* framework, under which we defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. *See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). HHS is generally entitled to *Chevron* deference on judicial review of its interpretations of the Medicare statute. *See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala*, 508 U.S. 402, 414 (1993); *Baystate Franklin Med. Ctr. v. Azar*, 950 F.3d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The Hospitals urge us not to apply *Chevron* in this case for several reasons, none of which is persuasive.

First, we disagree that HHS forfeited any right to *Chevron* deference. To the contrary, HHS explained in the district court why its interpretation was entitled to *Chevron* treatment, invoked the doctrine twice in its opening brief in our court, and argued for it again in its reply brief. And in any event, our decisions hold that *Chevron* deference is not subject to forfeiture based on an agency's litigation conduct if the agency's challenged action "interpret[ed] a statute it is charged with administering in a manner (and through a process) evincing an exercise of its lawmaking authority." *SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.*, 904 F.3d 41, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2018). That is the case here. *See* 83 Fed. Reg. at 59,009, 59,011.

Second, the Hospitals contend that HHS's interpretation of subparagraph (2)(F) in the challenged rule is inconsistent with earlier agency pronouncements, such that the rule is arbitrary and unworthy of *Chevron* deference. *See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro*, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016). But HHS has never taken a definitive position on the scope of subparagraph (2)(F). The Hospitals point to one sentence in the agency's first OPPTS rulemaking cautioning that "[a]dditional study, analysis, and possible legislative modification would be necessary before [the agency] could consider implementing" a volume-control method involving direct changes to reimbursement. Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System for Hospital Outpatient Services, 63 Fed. Reg. 47,552, 47,586 (Sept. 8, 1998). Even assuming that statement amounted to an announcement of agency policy, which is far from clear, its meaning is ambiguous. As the district court concluded in its decision, the agency might well have thought that a "possible legislative modification would be necessary" because its proposed volume-control method would have required amending a separate statutory formula pertaining to its proposal, not because it believed that direct rate changes could never qualify as a "method for controlling" volume under (2)(F). *See Am. Hosp. Ass'n*, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 157 n.8.

Nor, contrary to the Hospitals' contention, has HHS long viewed subparagraph (2)(F) to require volume-control methods to be budget-neutral. It is true that the agency previously implemented a volume-control method called "packaging," which bundles related services together into a single payment group, in a budget-neutral manner. *See Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and CY 2008 Payment Rates*, 72 Fed. Reg. 66,580, 66,615 (Nov. 27, 2007). That example, though, does not establish that HHS viewed (2)(F) as requiring budget-neutrality. The agency implemented "packaging" via other

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statutory authorities, including its power to alter the composition of APC groups and their scaled weights. *See id.* at 66,611, 66,615; 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(B)–(C), (t)(9)(A). Those adjustment authorities require budget-neutrality. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(9)(B). HHS implemented packaging in a budget-neutral way not because it was a (2)(F) method, but because it involved other statutory adjustments that call for budget-neutrality. *See* 72 Fed. Reg. at 66,615 (budget-neutrality implicated because of “changes in APC weights and codes” and resulting “shifts in median costs” of those APCs).

Finally, we reject the Hospitals’ argument that *Chevron* does not apply when, as here, our consideration of the agency’s statutory authority merges with our consideration of the applicability of a preclusion provision. *See* Part II, *supra*. That result would mean that Congress’s decision to enact a preclusion provision operated to enhance judicial scrutiny and restrict the agency’s leeway. In precluding judicial review of certain HHS actions, though, Congress necessarily intended the opposite outcome. *See Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 112 (noting “havoc that piecemeal [judicial] review of OPPI payments could bring about”).

B.

Having rejected the Hospitals’ arguments against applying *Chevron*, we proceed to review HHS’s interpretation of subparagraph 1395l(t)(2)(F) under *Chevron*’s two-step framework. We first ask whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842. If so, our work is done, for we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” *Id.* at 843. But if the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to th[at] specific issue,” *id.*, we assume “Congress has empowered the

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agency to resolve the ambiguity,” and we defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable. *Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. EPA*, 573 U.S. 302, 315 (2014).

The question at issue is whether HHS may reduce the OPPS reimbursement for a specific service, and may implement that cut in a non-budget-neutral manner, as a “method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of” the service. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F). In our view, Congress did not “unambiguously forbid” the agency from doing so. *Barnhart v. Walton*, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002); *Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA*, 734 F.3d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2013). We further conclude that the agency reasonably read subparagraph (2)(F) to allow a service-specific, non-budget-neutral reimbursement cut in the circumstances we consider here. We therefore hold that the agency acted within its statutory authority.

1.

At step one of *Chevron*, “the court begins with the text, and employs ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ to determine whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue.” *Prime Time Intern. Co v. Vilsack*, 599 F.3d 678, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 842–43 & n.9). Applying those tools, we conclude that the OPPS statute does not directly foreclose HHS’s challenged rate reduction.

To begin with, a service-specific, non-budget-neutral rate reduction falls comfortably within the plain text of subparagraph (2)(F). Reducing the payment rate for a particular OPPS service readily qualifies, in common parlance, as a “method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume” of that service. The lower the reimbursement rate for a service, the less the incentive to provide it, all else being

equal. Reducing the reimbursement rate thus is naturally suited to addressing unnecessary increases in the overall volume of a service provided by hospitals. As for whether a rate reduction under subparagraph (2)(F) can be non-budget-neutral, the provision simply says nothing about budget-neutrality. The text Congress enacted thus lends considerable support to the agency's reading of the statute at *Chevron* step one. See *Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. FAA*, 169 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (because operative "language d[id] not preclude the [agency's] interpretation," the contrary "inference petitioner would draw as to the statute's meaning [was] not inevitable").

The broader statutory context bolsters the agency's view that subparagraph (2)(F) authorizes service-specific rate cuts. Under our decision in *Amgen*, the agency can alter the reimbursement rate for a particular service under its subparagraph (2)(E) authority to make "adjustments [it] determine[s] to be necessary to ensure equitable payments," 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(E); see 357 F.3d at 117 (upholding use of equitable-adjustment authority to change "payment amount for a single drug"). If the agency can adjust payment rates in furtherance of the expansive purpose of achieving equitable payments, it stands to reason that the agency can also adjust rates to accomplish the more focused goal of controlling unnecessary volume growth. Indeed, as the *Amgen* court saw it, HHS's robust "discretion" to adjust payment rates is a central feature of the statutory scheme. 357 F.3d at 114 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 105-149, at 1323 (1997) and H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-217, at 785 (1997)).

The statutory context also supports construing subparagraph (2)(F) to allow non-budget-neutral adjustments. If the statute otherwise permits the agency to make a discretionary rate reduction as a method of volume control, it would be anomalous for the law to require the rate cut to be

implemented budget-neutrally. That would require HHS to redistribute the costs traceable to the provision of unnecessary services throughout the OPPS, resulting in no net savings to Medicare and largely negating the point of reducing reimbursement in the first place. *See* 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,142–43.

The Hospitals warn that, on that reading, nothing “prevents [HHS] from engaging in cost-control measures that will disproportionately affect only some service providers and beneficiaries.” Hospitals Br. 7. But budget-neutrality offers little protection against such outcomes. If HHS reduces reimbursements for cardiac catheterizations and then redistributes the savings across the OPPS, that still hurts cardiologists much more than orthopedists even if cardiologists would get some money back in the form of slightly elevated reimbursements for other services they provide. The agency’s ability to advance Congress’s apparent goals in both budget-neutrality and subparagraph (2)(F)—namely, keeping growth in overall OPPS expenditures modest and predictable year to year, *see generally supra* pp. 5–6—would be undermined, not advanced, by requiring the savings from (2)(F) volume-control methods to be redistributed across the OPPS.

The Hospitals also contend that, budget-neutrality aside, subparagraph (2)(F) unambiguously does not encompass service-specific rate adjustments. The Hospitals argue in that regard that subparagraph (2)(F) does no more than enable the agency to develop an “analytical mechanism for determining whether there is an unnecessary increase in volume.” Hospitals Br. 31 (formatting modified). That argument rests on reading subparagraph (2)(F) in conjunction with subparagraph (9)(C), which provides that:

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If the Secretary determines under methodologies described in paragraph (2)(F) that the volume of services paid for under this subsection increased beyond amounts established through those methodologies, the Secretary may appropriately adjust the update to the conversion factor otherwise applicable in a subsequent year.

42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(9)(C).

According to the Hospitals, subparagraph (9)(C) is the exclusive way for HHS to implement subparagraph (2)(F). On that understanding, (2)(F) empowers the agency to “develop a method” for diagnosing whether there has been too much growth in outpatient service volume, and if the agency decides there has, then it can respond by—and only by—using its (9)(C) authority to reduce the across-the-board conversion factor. (Recall that the conversion factor is the number by which relative payment weights for services are translated into actual reimbursement amounts. *See supra* pp. 4–5.) Subparagraph (2)(F), under the Hospitals’ argument, does not itself authorize the agency to act on an unnecessary increase in volume upon finding that one exists, much less to do so on a service-specific basis. Rather, the agency can act only by reducing the overall conversion factor under (9)(C).

That interpretation of subparagraph (2)(F) is difficult to square with the provision’s language. Subparagraph (2)(F) directs the agency to develop “a method for *controlling* unnecessary increases” in volume, not just a method for *assessing* whether unnecessary increases exist. And we think it unlikely that Congress would have confined the agency’s volume-control arsenal to the very blunt instrument of reducing the across-the-board conversion factor. The Hospitals identify

no reason to suppose that Congress would have been concerned only about *overall* OPPS volume growth, which the conversion factor can suitably address, but not about unwarranted growth in the volume of a single service, which the conversion factor cannot. Cutting the conversion factor would reduce reimbursement equally for every OPPS service, a poorly tailored, ineffectual “method” of controlling undesirable volume growth in a specific service.

The Hospitals respond that HHS’s reading of (2)(F) renders subparagraph (9)(C) redundant, because cutting the conversion factor fits textually as a “method for controlling” unnecessary volume. We do not see the redundancy. Subparagraph (9)(C) appears to come into play only after the agency first attempts to address unnecessary volume increases through methodologies implemented under subparagraph (2)(F): “If the Secretary determines under methodologies described in paragraph (2)(F) that” volume has “increased *beyond amounts established through those methodologies*, the Secretary may appropriately adjust the update to the conversion factor applicable in a *subsequent* year.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(9)(C) (emphases added). Because the (9)(C) authority thus kicks in only after the (2)(F) authority has been attempted and found inadequate, the former necessarily is not redundant of the latter.

At any rate, even if subparagraph (9)(C) did amount to surplusage under HHS’s reading of (2)(F), that would not necessarily compel rejecting the agency’s interpretation of (2)(F) at *Chevron* step one. “[A]t times Congress drafts provisions that appear duplicative of others—simply, in Macbeth’s words, ‘to make assurance double sure.’” *Fla. Health Scis. Ctr., Inc. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.*, 830 F.3d 515, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). There may have been particular reason for Congress to do so here. In

specifying how HHS is to calculate the conversion factor, the statute envisions that the conversion factor will generally be “increased” each year, 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(3)(C), (t)(3)(C)(ii). In that light, Congress could have thought it desirable to confirm the agency’s power to *reduce* the conversion factor in response to volume growth, as subparagraph (9)(C) does.

Next, the Hospitals argue that subparagraph (2)(F)’s silence on budget-neutrality is itself evidence that Congress could not have intended the provision to allow direct rate adjustments. As noted, subparagraph (2)(F) does not address whether volume-control “method[s]” under that provision must be implemented in a budget-neutral fashion. Yet the OPSS statute nearly always specifies, one way or the other, whether a rate-adjustment authority must be exercised budget-neutrally. *See Am. Hosp. Ass’n*, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 159 (citing provisions). To the Hospitals, subparagraph (2)(F)’s comparative silence indicates that Congress did not intend the provision to authorize changes to payment rates.

But subparagraph (2)(F) undisputedly authorizes actions *other* than direct rate adjustments, and for at least some of those actions, a budget-neutrality requirement would make no sense. For example, the Hospitals do not dispute that subparagraph (2)(F) would allow HHS, as a volume-control method, to require additional paperwork from hospitals seeking reimbursement for certain outpatient procedures. That kind of volume-control method, of course, is unsusceptible to a budget-neutrality mandate. Thus, (2)(F)’s silence on budget-neutrality tells us little about whether (2)(F) includes the authority to reduce a particular OPSS rate.

Lastly, the Hospitals make a similar argument based on paragraph 1395l(t)(4), which sets out how “[t]he amount of payment made from the Trust Fund under this part for a

covered [outpatient] service . . . furnished in a year is determined.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(4). Paragraph (4) makes no mention of subparagraph (2)(F). But it expressly allows payment amounts to be “adjusted” under other provisions, such as subparagraphs (2)(D) and (2)(E), which authorize various adjustments including labor-cost adjustments and equitable adjustments. That, the Hospitals contend, is strong evidence that Congress did not intend direct modification of OPPS payment rates via subparagraph (2)(F).

Text and precedent, however, indicate that not all changes to OPPS rates must flow through paragraph (4). A number of provisions in the OPPS statute authorize HHS to set or adjust reimbursement rates for specific outpatient services but are unaddressed by paragraph (4). *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(14) (providing separate formula for calculating “amount of payment under this subsection for a specified covered outpatient drug”); *id.* § 1395l(t)(15) (prescribing “amount [to be] provided for payment for [an ungrouped] drug or biological under this part”); *id.* § 1395l(t)(16)(D) (requiring payment reduction for a certain surgical procedure performed by certain hospitals); *id.* § 1395l(t)(16)(F)(i)–(ii) (requiring payment reductions for various imaging services); *id.* § 1395l(t)(22) (authorizing Secretary to make “revisions to payments” “made under this subsection for covered [outpatient] services” in order to decrease opioid prescriptions). Consequently, paragraph (4) is best understood to set out only the general mechanism—not the exclusive mechanism—by which specific OPPS rates for covered services are “determined.”

Our decision in *Amgen* supports that understanding of paragraph (4). In that case, HHS used its equitable-adjustment authority under subparagraph (2)(E) to reduce a “transitional pass-through” payment for a drug to zero dollars. 357 F.3d at 107. The drug’s manufacturer complained that HHS could not

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make that sort of equitable adjustment because paragraph (t)(6) lays out a specific formula for determining the “amount of the [transitional pass-through] payment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(6)(A), 1395l(t)(6)(D). *Amgen* rejected that argument, holding that (t)(6)’s seemingly “mandatory” provisions establish only “default OPPS rate calculations subject to later adjustment.” 357 F.3d at 115. Under *Amgen*, then, although (t)(6) specifies in detail how pass-through payments must be calculated without mentioning subparagraph (2)(E), the agency can nonetheless adjust the results of the (t)(6) formula using its (2)(E) authority. The same, we think, is true—or at least, not unambiguously untrue—of (t)(4) and (2)(F), respectively.

We thus conclude that the OPPS statute does not unambiguously foreclose HHS’s adoption of a service-specific, non-budget-neutral rate cut as a “method for controlling unnecessary increases in” volume. 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F). The statute is at least ambiguous as to whether that sort of rate adjustment lies within the agency’s (2)(F) authority.

2.

At *Chevron* step two, we ask whether the agency’s interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA*, 734 F.3d 1115, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843). “A ‘reasonable’ explanation of how an agency’s interpretation serves the statute’s objectives is the stuff of which a ‘permissible’ construction is made.” *Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC*, 412 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

The challenged rule meets that standard. The agency explained that recent growth in the volume of E&M services

provided at off-campus PBDs was “unnecessary because it appears to have been incentivized by the difference in payment for each setting rather than patient acuity.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 59,007. The agency further concluded that reducing payments in order to eliminate that incentive “would be an effective method to control the volume of these unnecessary services because the payment differential that is driving the site-of-service decision will be removed.” *Id.* at 59,009.

That interpretation of subparagraph (2)(F) is both “textually defensible” and “fits ‘the design of the statute as a whole and . . . its object and policy.’” *Good Samaritan Hosp.*, 508 U.S. at 418, 419 (quoting *Crandon v. United States*, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)). It is reasonable to think that Congress, which cared enough about unnecessary volume to instruct the agency to “develop a method for controlling” it, would have wanted the agency to avoid causing unnecessary volume growth with its own reimbursement practices. We thus defer to the agency’s conclusion that (2)(F) allowed it to address that problem by reducing a specific rate.

Sustaining HHS’s challenged reduction in this case would not necessarily leave the agency free “to set any payment rate for any service, without regard to the fine-grained statutory scheme enacted by Congress.” *Hospitals Br.* 45. It is one thing for HHS to use its subparagraph (2)(F) authority to eliminate a volume-growth incentive created, in the agency’s view, by a differential in its own payment rates. It may be another thing for the agency to reduce payment for a service under (2)(F) merely because doing so would decrease volume that HHS decides is “unnecessary.” We have no occasion to decide whether an action of that kind would rest on a reasonable interpretation of the OPPI statute. *Cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA.*, 777 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (agency’s interpretation cannot be “untethered to Congress’s approach”

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at *Chevron* step two); *Amgen*, 357 F.3d at 117 (equitable adjustments may not “work basic and fundamental changes in the scheme Congress created in the Medicare Act” (quotation omitted)).

In short, we conclude under *Chevron* that HHS’s reduction in reimbursement for E&M services provided by off-campus PBDs qualifies as a “method for controlling unnecessary increases in the volume of covered [outpatient] services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(2)(F). Because the challenged rate cut is thus a “method[] described in paragraph (2)(F),” judicial review of that action is precluded by the statute. *See id.* § 1395l(t)(12)(A). Consequently, neither we nor the district court has jurisdiction over the Hospitals’ challenge.

IV.

The Hospitals argue in the alternative that HHS’s decision to reduce E&M reimbursement to off-campus PBDs contravenes section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015. As explained, Congress enacted that provision in response to reports that the payment differential between off-campus PBDs and freestanding physician practices had induced hospitals to purchase those practices. Section 603 established that services performed at off-campus PBDs would no longer be paid under the OPPS but instead would be paid under a scheme approximating the Physician Fee Schedule. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(1)(B)(v), 1395l(t)(21)(C). But the law exempted “department[s] of a provider . . . that [furnished covered outpatient services] prior to November 2, 2015.” *Id.* § 1395l(t)(21)(B)(ii). In the Hospitals’ view, Congress’s decision to leave the rates paid to preexisting off-campus PBDs unaddressed in section 603 means that the statute should be read to bar HHS from cutting reimbursement rates for those facilities.

Because the Hospitals' section 603 argument targets agency action we have already determined qualifies as a "method[] described in paragraph (2)(F)," we are doubtful we have jurisdiction to consider it. *See id.* § 1395l(t)(12)(A). In any event, we reject the argument on the merits. (The law of our circuit allows a court to assume hypothetical *statutory* jurisdiction even if we cannot assume Article III jurisdiction. *See Kramer v. Gates*, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007).) Nothing in the text of section 603 indicates that preexisting off-campus PBDs are forever exempt from adjustments to their reimbursement. Rather, the text of the law exempts those providers from the change mandated by section 603 itself, leaving the exempted providers subject to all the provisions of the OPSS statute, including subparagraph (2)(F). It bears noting, moreover, that section 603's exemption of preexisting off-campus PBDs from the reimbursement reductions effected by that statute retains practical effect for all OPSS services except the one type of service (E&M services) addressed by the challenged rule.

Trying a different approach, the Hospitals contend that section 603 demonstrates Congress's judgment that increases in volume at preexisting off-campus PBDs are not "unnecessary" in the sense contemplated by subparagraph (2)(F). But even assuming that were true for increases in volume occurring by 2015, when section 603 was enacted, it would not mean that Congress considered acceptable the continued volume increases later taking place in 2016, 2017, or 2018, on which HHS relied in adopting the challenged rule. *See* 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,139; MedPAC, *Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy* 73 (Mar. 2018), <https://go.usa.gov/xdCzu>. Section 603 thus does not stand in the way of the agency's challenged rate reduction under (2)(F).

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For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

A. PARTIES

1. Parties and amici appearing before the District Court and in this Court in these consolidated cases are the following:

Appellee American Hospital Association (AHA) is a national, not-for-profit organization that represents and serves nearly 5,000 hospitals, health care systems, and networks, plus 43,000 individual members. Its mission is to advance the health of individuals and communities by leading, representing, and serving the hospitals, systems, and other related organizations. AHA has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) is a national, not-for-profit association that serves all 154 accredited U.S. medical schools, nearly 400 major teaching hospitals and health systems, and more than 80 academic societies. AAMC advocates on behalf of its members and patients in connection with national health-policy matters. AAMC has no parent corporation and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Mercy Health Muskegon is a Catholic nonprofit hospital that serves the greater Muskegon, Michigan area and surrounding communities. Mercy Health Muskegon is an operating unit of Mercy Health Partners. Mercy Health

Partners is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trinity Health Michigan, Inc. Trinity Health Michigan Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trinity Health, Inc., which has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Clallam County Public Hospital No. 2, d/b/a Olympic Medical Center is a comprehensive health care provider serving the North Olympic Peninsula with a network of facilities in Clallam County, Washington. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee York Hospital is a small community hospital located in York, Maine and serving the surrounding area. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University of Kansas Hospital Authority is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Kansas City, Kansas, and affiliated with the University of Kansas School of Medicine. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Jersey Shore University Medical Center, is a not-for-profit hospital located in Neptune, New Jersey. It is the only academic university-level teaching hospital in the coastal New Jersey and

the Central Jersey area. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Barnes-Jewish Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in St. Louis, Missouri. It is affiliated with the Washington University School of Medicine. It is owned by BJC Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Barnes-Jewish West County Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in the western St. Louis County, Missouri. It is owned by BJC Healthcare, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Blue Ridge Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a CHS Blue Ridge, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Morganton, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Carilion Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in Roanoke, Virginia. It is owned by Carilion Clinic, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Central Vermont Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital serving approximately 66,000 people in central Vermont. It is owned by the University of Vermont Medical Center Inc, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital located in Whiteville, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee East Baton Rouge Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Ochsner Medical Center – Baton Rouge is a not-for-profit hospital located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It is owned by Ochsner Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Florida Health Sciences Center Inc., d/b/a Tampa General Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in downtown Tampa, Florida. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center is a Catholic not-for-profit hospital located in Lafayette, Louisiana. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center is a Catholic not-for-profit hospital located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that serves as a teaching hospital for several institutions, including Louisiana State University and Tulane University. It has no

parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Bayshore Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital located in Holmdel, New Jersey. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Riverview Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital serving the northern region of Monmouth County, New Jersey. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Heartland Regional Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital located in Marion, Illinois. It is owned by Mosaic Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Lima Memorial Health System is a not-for-profit healthcare organization serving northwest Ohio. It is owned by the Lima Memorial Joint Operating Company, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Mercy Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in Canton, Ohio. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Missouri Baptist Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in West St. Louis County, Saint Louis, Missouri. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a Montefiore Medical Center is a not-for-profit academic medical center located in the Norwood section of the Bronx, New York City, and is the primary teaching hospital of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a St. Luke's Cornwall Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital located in Newburgh, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a White Plains Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital located in White Plains, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Northwest Medical Center is a for-profit hospital located in Springdale, Arkansas. The parent corporation of Northwest Medical Center is Community Health Systems, which is publicly traded as CHSPSC, LLC.

Appellee NYU Langone Health System is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in New York City, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee NYU Winthrop Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Mineola, New York. It is owned by NYU Langone Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Ochsner Clinic Foundation, d/b/a Oschner Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital, located in New Orleans, Louisiana. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Anthony Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Rockford, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of The Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Anthony's Health Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Alton, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of The Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Francis Medical Center is located in Peoria, Illinois, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Peoria, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a St. Joseph Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Bloomington, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Piedmont Newnan Hospital, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital located in Newnan, Georgia. It is owned by Piedmont Hospital, Inc., which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Progress West Healthcare Center, d/b/a Progress West Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in O'Fallon, Missouri. It is owned by BJC Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Rush University Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Chicago, Illinois. It is owned by Rush System for Health, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Sarasota Memorial Hospital is a teaching hospital located in Sarasota, Florida. It is affiliated with Florida State University College of Medicine. It is owned by Sarasota Memorial Hospital and Health Care System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Southwest General Health Center is a not-for-profit hospital, located in Middleburg Heights, Ohio. It is partnered with University Hospitals of Cleveland. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Stanford Health Care is a not-for-profit medical center, located in Stanford, California. It serves as a teaching hospital for the Stanford University School of Medicine. It is owned by Leland Stanford Junior University, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Tarrant County Hospital District, d/b/a JPS Health Network is the public hospital district of Tarrant County, Texas. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Lincoln, is a teaching acute care hospital located in Lincolnton, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Pineville, is a teaching hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Union, is a teaching hospital located in Monroe, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health University City is a teaching acute care hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas HealthCare System NorthEast is a teaching acute care hospital located in Concord, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Medical Center is a teaching hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, d/b/a University of Virginia Medical Center, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Charlottesville, Virginia. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University Hospitals Health System, Inc., d/b/a UH Cleveland Medical Center, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in Cleveland, Ohio. It is an affiliate hospital of Case Western Reserve University. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University Hospitals Health System, Inc., d/b/a UH Elyria Medical Center, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Elyria, Ohio. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University Hospitals Health System, Inc., d/b/a UH Geauga Medical Center, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Chardon, Ohio. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Burlington, Vermont. It is affiliated with the University of Vermont College of Medicine and the University of Vermont College of Nursing and Health Sciences. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Vanderbilt University Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching medical complex in Nashville, Tennessee. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellant is Alex M. Azar II, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health & Human Services.

Digestive Health Physicians Association, Large Urology Group Practice Association, and The OrthoForum filed an amicus brief.

2. Parties and amici appearing before the district court, but who have not entered an appearance on appeal, are the following:

AnMed Health System, d/b/a AnMed Health d/b/a AnMed Health Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

AnMed Health System, d/b/a Cannon Memorial Hospital, Inc. d/b/a AnMed Health Cannon participated as a party in the District Court.

Copley Memorial Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Rush Copley Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Fayette Community Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Fayette Hospital, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a OSF Heart of Mary Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a OSF Sacred Heart Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Ottawa Regional Hospital & Healthcare Center d/b/a OSF Saint Elizabeth Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint James Hospital participated as a party in the District Court.

Piedmont Athens Regional Medical Center, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

Piedmont Hospital, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

Piedmont Mountainside Hospital, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

Rush Oak Park Hospital, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

Scotland Health Care System, d/b/a Scotland Regional participated as a party in the District Court.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Anson participated as a party in the District Court.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Cleveland participated as a party in the District Court.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Kings Mountain participated as a party in the District Court.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas HealthCare System Stanly participated as a party in the District Court.

The Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. participated as a party in the District Court.

Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Heart Hospital of Acadiana, LLC participated as a party in the District Court.

Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of the Angels Hospital participated as a party in the District Court.

Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of the Lake Ascension Community Hospital-St. Elizabeth Hospital participated as a party in the District Court.

Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Hackensack University Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a JFK Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Ocean Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Palisades Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Raritan Bay Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Southern Ocean Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a St. Mary Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

Shannon Medical Center participated as a party in the District Court.

The Wooster Community Hospital Auxiliary, Inc., d/b/a Wooster Community Hospital participated as a party in the District Court.

America's Essential Hospitals participated as amicus in the District Court.

B. RULINGS UNDER REVIEW

References to the rulings at issue appear in the Brief for Defendant-Appellant.

C. RELATED CASES

These cases were not previously before this Court. CMS has noted that related jurisdictional issues are pending before this Court in *American Hospital Association v. Azar*, Nos. 19-5048 & 19-5198 (D.C. Cir.) (opinion filed and mandate withheld July 31, 2020). These consolidated cases involve a Medicare payment rule that governed the 2019 year. Appellees have filed separate lawsuits seeking relief with respect to the Medicare payment rule that governs the 2020 year. Those suits are pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. *See American Hospital Association v. Azar*, No. 1:20-cv-80 (D.D.C.); *University of Kansas Hospital Authority v. Azar*, No. 1:20-cv-75 (D.D.C.).

/s/ Catherine E. Stetson
Catherine E. Stetson

CIRCUIT RULE 26.1 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Appellee American Hospital Association (AHA) is a national, not-for-profit organization that represents and serves nearly 5,000 hospitals, health care systems, and networks, plus 43,000 individual members. Its mission is to advance the health of individuals and communities by leading, representing, and serving the hospitals, systems, and other related organizations. AHA has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) is a national, not-for-profit association that serves all 154 accredited U.S. medical schools, nearly 400 major teaching hospitals and health systems, and more than 80 academic societies. AAMC advocates on behalf of its members and patients in connection with national health-policy matters. AAMC has no parent corporation and no publicly held company has a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Mercy Health Muskegon is a Catholic nonprofit hospital that serves the greater Muskegon, Michigan area and surrounding communities. Mercy Health Muskegon is an operating unit of Mercy Health Partners. Mercy Health Partners is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trinity Health Michigan, Inc. Trinity Health Michigan Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Trinity Health, Inc., which

has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Clallam County Public Hospital No. 2, d/b/a Olympic Medical Center is a comprehensive health care provider serving the North Olympic Peninsula with a network of facilities in Clallam County, Washington. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee York Hospital is a small community hospital located in York, Maine and serving the surrounding area. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University of Kansas Hospital Authority is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Kansas City, Kansas, and affiliated with the University of Kansas School of Medicine. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Jersey Shore University Medical Center, is a not-for-profit hospital located in Neptune, New Jersey. It is the only academic university-level teaching hospital in the coastal New Jersey and the Central Jersey area. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Barnes-Jewish Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in St. Louis, Missouri. It is affiliated with the Washington University School of Medicine. It is owned by BJC Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Barnes-Jewish West County Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in the western St. Louis County, Missouri. It is owned by BJC Healthcare, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Blue Ridge Healthcare System, Inc., d/b/a CHS Blue Ridge, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Morganton, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Carilion Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in Roanoke, Virginia. It is owned by Carilion Clinic, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Central Vermont Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital serving approximately 66,000 people in central Vermont. It is owned by the University of Vermont Medical Center Inc, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Columbus Regional Healthcare System, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital located in Whiteville, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee East Baton Rouge Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Ochsner Medical Center – Baton Rouge is a not-for-profit hospital located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. It is owned by Ochsner Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Florida Health Sciences Center Inc., d/b/a Tampa General Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in downtown Tampa, Florida. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of Lourdes Regional Medical Center is a Catholic not-for-profit hospital located in Lafayette, Louisiana. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Franciscan Missionaries of Our Lady Health System, Inc., d/b/a Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center is a Catholic not-for-profit hospital located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana that serves as a teaching hospital for several institutions, including Louisiana State University and Tulane University. It has no

parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Bayshore Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital located in Holmdel, New Jersey. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Hackensack Meridian Health, d/b/a Riverview Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital serving the northern region of Monmouth County, New Jersey. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Heartland Regional Medical Center is a not-for-profit hospital located in Marion, Illinois. It is owned by Mosaic Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Lima Memorial Health System is a not-for-profit healthcare organization serving northwest Ohio. It is owned by the Lima Memorial Joint Operating Company, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Mercy Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in Canton, Ohio. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Missouri Baptist Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital in West St. Louis County, Saint Louis, Missouri. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a Montefiore Medical Center is a not-for-profit academic medical center located in the Norwood section of the Bronx, New York City, and is the primary teaching hospital of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a St. Luke's Cornwall Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital located in Newburgh, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Montefiore Health System, Inc., d/b/a White Plains Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital located in White Plains, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Northwest Medical Center is a for-profit hospital located in Springdale, Arkansas. The parent corporation of Northwest Medical Center is Community Health Systems, which is publicly traded as CHSPSC, LLC.

Appellee NYU Langone Health System is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in New York City, New York. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee NYU Winthrop Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Mineola, New York. It is owned by NYU Langone Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Ochsner Clinic Foundation, d/b/a Oschner Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital, located in New Orleans, Louisiana. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Anthony Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Rockford, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of The Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Anthony's Health Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Alton, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of The Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a Saint Francis Medical Center is located in Peoria, Illinois, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Peoria, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee OSF Healthcare System, d/b/a St. Joseph Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Bloomington, Illinois. It is owned by the Sisters of the Third Order of St Francis, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Piedmont Newnan Hospital, Inc. is a not-for-profit hospital located in Newnan, Georgia. It is owned by Piedmont Hospital, Inc., which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Progress West Healthcare Center, d/b/a Progress West Hospital is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in O'Fallon, Missouri. It is owned by BJC Health System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Rush University Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Chicago, Illinois. It is owned by Rush System for Health, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Sarasota Memorial Hospital is a teaching hospital located in Sarasota, Florida. It is affiliated with Florida State University College of Medicine. It is owned by Sarasota Memorial Hospital and Health Care System, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Southwest General Health Center is a not-for-profit hospital, located in Middleburg Heights, Ohio. It is partnered with University Hospitals of Cleveland. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Stanford Health Care is a not-for-profit medical center, located in Stanford, California. It serves as a teaching hospital for the Stanford University School of Medicine. It is owned by Leland Stanford Junior University, which is not a publicly traded company.

Appellee Tarrant County Hospital District, d/b/a JPS Health Network is the public hospital district of Tarrant County, Texas. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Lincoln, is a teaching acute care hospital located in Lincolnton, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Pineville, is a teaching hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health Union, is a teaching hospital located in Monroe, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Atrium Health University City is a teaching acute care hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas HealthCare System NorthEast is a teaching acute care hospital located in Concord, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Medical Center is a teaching hospital located in Charlotte, North Carolina. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

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Appellee University Hospitals Health System, Inc., d/b/a UH Geauga Medical Center, is a not-for-profit teaching hospital located in Chardon, Ohio. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee University of Vermont Medical Center, Inc. is a not-for-profit teaching medical center located in Burlington, Vermont. It is affiliated with the University of Vermont College of Medicine and the University of Vermont College of Nursing and Health Sciences. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest.

Appellee Vanderbilt University Medical Center is a not-for-profit teaching medical complex in Nashville, Tennessee. It has no parent corporation and no publicly held company owns a 10% or greater ownership interest

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 31, 2020, the foregoing petition was electronically filed through this Court's CM/ECF system, which will send a notice of filing to all registered users.

/s/ Catherine E. Stetson
Catherine E. Stetson