Why Hackers Are Targeting Hospital Operational Technology

Hospital cyberattacks are moving beyond patient data, and hackers are actively targeting the operational technologies that keep hospitals running. In this conversation, Brian Kaiser, supervisory special agent with the FBI's Cyber Division, and Chad Beebe, deputy executive director of the American Society for Health Care Engineering (ASHE), explain why hospital operational technology is increasingly vulnerable, how attacks can disrupt patient care, and what hospitals can do to protect these critical systems. 


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00:00:00:00 - 00:00:23:14
Tom Haederle
Welcome to Advancing Health. Cybercrime against hospitals is unfortunately expanding beyond attacks aimed at things like information systems and operating equipment. Law enforcement has noticed an uptick in cyber assaults directed against fundamental support systems like elevators or water systems, what is commonly called operational technology.

00:00:23:16 - 00:00:52:21
Scott Gee
Ransomware and fishing are often the first two things that come to mind when we talk about cyberattacks on hospitals, but there's so much more to it than that. I'm Scott Gee, deputy national advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk here at the American Hospital Association. Joining me today is supervisory Special Agent Brian Kaiser from the FBI's Cyber Division and the deputy executive director of the American Society of Healthcare Engineering, Chad Beebe, to talk about operational technology within hospitals and why it's becoming a key target for cyber criminals.

00:00:53:02 - 00:00:55:04
Scott Gee
Good morning, Brian. Good morning, Chad.

00:00:55:06 - 00:00:57:06
Brian Kaiser
Good morning. Good morning.

00:00:57:08 - 00:01:21:09
Scott Gee
This past year, we've seen more cyberattacks and threats to operational technology or OT than ever before. These systems are being attacked specifically by foreign nation/state adversaries, and they pose critical vulnerabilities to hospitals. Let's get started with a simple definition, Brian. Walk me through exactly what operational technology is and how it impacts hospitals.

00:01:21:11 - 00:01:42:01
Brian Kaiser
I think that's a that's a great question, because operational technology will be defined differently depending on who you talk to. And so the way that we at the FBI define it are systems that are used to make or change something in the actual physical environment, right. This is much different from what we define as an IT system, where an IT system really is

00:01:42:04 - 00:01:55:20
Brian Kaiser
how do I make and change and edit data? What we're talking about here are things that are automating sensors. They're automating specific actuators, things that exist in physical environments that make physical changes. And that's how we define it.

00:01:55:22 - 00:02:11:07
Scott Gee
Things like elevators, heating ventilation and air conditioning in hospitals, water systems and medical gases are two critical subsystems. Chad, from your perspective, what do you consider operational technology and what are your concerns with it in in hospitals?

00:02:11:09 - 00:02:41:00
Chad Beebe
I would say we define it a little bit more into two different types of operational technologies. We have technologies that simply monitor building systems, and we also have technology that controls those systems. Like Brian was talking about. Both can be attacked and they can both be an effective way for a bad player to try to either create confusion at a healthcare facility or to actually gain access to other systems at healthcare facilities.

00:02:41:02 - 00:03:05:16
Chad Beebe
Pretty much everything is connected these days. I mean, even toilets can be connected to the internet just to monitor water flow and potential maintenance issues. We also have a lot of fire alarm systems, as well as security controls that can also just monitor but also control the systems as well. So people may think of all these building systems as just systems and not computers.

00:03:05:17 - 00:03:16:01
Chad Beebe
They're both. And it's an it's important for us to treat them as both. So they both take some sort of security from an IT perspective as well as physical security.

00:03:16:03 - 00:03:43:06
Scott Gee
Absolutely. And Chad, you mentioned monitoring systems. One of the alerts we've published recently and actually published an update to based on some FBI publication, was temperature monitoring for the blood supply. We've seen an attempted attack. This happened in France, not in the US, but an attempted attack on the blood supply, where bad guys were attempting to manipulate temperature control in the blood storage facility.

00:03:43:08 - 00:04:07:19
Scott Gee
And as you know, if blood is not stored at the proper temperature and it exceeds that temperature by a few degrees for more than an hour, that entire blood supply has to be thrown away. And that is a huge impact to care delivery. That's why this really matters, Brian. And let's talk about how these attacks look different from other traditional cyberattacks and how do we defend ourselves?

00:04:08:00 - 00:04:29:11
Brian Kaiser
Yeah, absolutely. I think the biggest thing that is different from an attack against operational technology versus in attack against information technology, the real issue is that when an actor gets onto a system, they have to affect the physical process in some way. Now, oftentimes that requires additional knowledge and understanding of what the environment looks like. Oftentimes they can get on to a system

00:04:29:11 - 00:04:48:05
Brian Kaiser
and just by messing with some of the controls and the things that are in place, it can cause issues downstream. And so, you know, the big thing that makes a difference here is that an actor will need to in some way affect that process to cause sabotage downstream. And it's a different game when we're talking about an attack against operational technology versus an attack against IT.

00:04:48:06 - 00:05:00:07
Brian Kaiser
Oftentimes in IT the goal is just to get access to your data. Once I get that access and I get it off the system, I've won. Here again, there's a lot more layers to go through and things that you need to work through to be able to have an effect.

00:05:00:11 - 00:05:27:04
Scott Gee
My concern, I guess, would be if a hospital is dealing with a situation where they've lost accuracy, the blood supply is a perfect example. If they think the temperature has been manipulated and the temperature has been too high in the storage area for a period of time, that didn't require actual changing the temperature, it just required changing the information, manipulating the information that the hospital was getting, and out of an abundance of caution

00:05:27:04 - 00:05:48:21
Scott Gee
they're going to have to throw that blood supply away. These are almost more insidious attacks than, well, I would say certainly more insidious attacks than data theft and other breaches we've seen short of ransomware that shuts down an entire hospital. But that's a key differentiator, is that these attacks are a little bit harder to affect, right? Are they harder to detect also?

00:05:48:23 - 00:06:11:06
Brian Kaiser
Sometimes they can be. But a lot of that comes down to the fact that there isn't much option when it comes to sensors and everything else because of some of the protocols and the technology that they use, you're not able to really see into those protocols as well as some of the more popular protocols that are already out there, such as HTTP and NIP, right? They're documented differently.

00:06:11:08 - 00:06:31:05
Brian Kaiser
Some people use custom protocols, and it depends really on how your sensors and the capabilities around sensing is set up. And so I think it brings up an important point though, is that where the defenders have an advantage is that you can set up that sensing in a way that can stop something like a physical action from happening, right?

00:06:31:06 - 00:06:52:11
Brian Kaiser
So if I have my sensor set up so that I know, okay, this thing is independently verifiable, that it has not gotten below this temperature, may have backups for that, if that's part of my very, very critical processes. Thinking through that prior to I think is huge. And that's what a lot of places I think, in organizations need to do is to sit down and intentionally say, what is that worst case scenario

00:06:52:11 - 00:07:09:23
Brian Kaiser
and how can I put in more fail safes in place? I mean, we do this all the time with physical attacks and physical issues that may come up within critical infrastructure, and it's kind of just shifting that in now to say that cyber can do the same things. We just need to be more, more intentional about it and think about how do we mitigate those.

00:07:09:24 - 00:07:29:22
Scott Gee
So it's almost a matter of cyber visibility of the problem. So Chad, that brings us back to something you and I have talked about many times. And, and you've mentioned earlier that sort of disconnect between facilities teams and cyber security teams. What can we do to bridge that gap? How do we how do we fix that?

00:07:29:24 - 00:07:53:08
Chad Beebe
Yeah. You know, a lot of it's about education and having the conversation. I think collectively across everybody in healthcare and you know, everybody, we always kind of go with this attitude that, well, this won't happen to me, right. So we've got to change that culture to be we are not going to let this happen to us. And I think a lot of organizations have taken those steps, and they're starting to look at that.

00:07:53:09 - 00:08:11:05
Chad Beebe
And now we need to make sure that everybody's a part of that conversation. When it comes to facilities, one of the issues that we have that that makes it a little difficult is that when you start seeing an abnormal condition, if you're monitoring something and it starts giving you some strange readings, you're going to automatically think, well, this is a maintenance issue.

00:08:11:05 - 00:08:27:14
Chad Beebe
I've got a sensor problem, a failed sensor or something like that. You go out and you look at it and you're like, gosh, I don't really see anything wrong with it. And then they go on to the next issue. They, you know, have to go, you know, fix a broken door somewhere. And, and we need a clear communication channel there to say,

00:08:27:16 - 00:08:44:00
Chad Beebe
huh, I had strange behavior. People need to know we had this strange behavior and needs need to keep watching that to see if it continues and start looking into it. Because that might be the first signs of a cyberattack. You don't know, because a lot of times, you know, there's a little bit of experimentation with a cyberattack that comes right before it.

00:08:44:01 - 00:08:58:18
Chad Beebe
You know, it's like, well, can we actually change this? Can we get in? Oh, we're in. Okay, now let's do the real thing. So we need to have those clear channels. But that's not the way we think of things in facilities really. You know, we don't we're not thinking of those bad actors like that. It's usually just a piece of equipment that's broken.

00:08:58:18 - 00:09:08:08
Chad Beebe
And 99.9% of the time that's what it's going to be. But it's that .01 percent that that's really going to affect us, that we need to start paying more attention to.

00:09:08:10 - 00:09:25:18
Scott Gee
You're absolutely right. It's a matter of education and getting those cyber teams and physical operations teams connected and understanding each other's language, understanding each other's problems and challenges. Brian, why is health care operational technology becoming an increased target for cyber attacks?

00:09:25:20 - 00:09:48:11
Brian Kaiser
The activity that we see now is really happening and this could change in the future, I will caveat that. But what's happening right now is that there's insecure configurations, network configurations that are exposing devices that should not be exposed. It's understandable in some senses that, you know, engineers want to be able to get to something quickly, fix that problem if they need to, in a really timely manner

00:09:48:12 - 00:10:10:18
Brian Kaiser
especially as you mentioned, with blood, right? There may be a sensitivity to be able to do that quickly. So people expose these things to the internet. Really what we're seeing lately is that as these things are come online, it gives our adversaries the ability to go after them as well, right. And so I think again, this goes into your considerations of what am I actually putting online specifically and what am I digitizing.

00:10:10:20 - 00:10:34:12
Brian Kaiser
As we talk about that and as we see these things consistently stay online, right, that's where I think the opportunity comes for the actors. Now, I think one of the other things that the FBI talks about frequently is the fact that as geopolitical tensions start to rise, actors are more inclined to cause destructive effects. And it's shown in some of the activity that we've put out through our CSAs and things that have happened in the past.

00:10:34:12 - 00:10:48:03
Brian Kaiser
And so I really do think that the danger right now and the risk right now is coming more from the fact that these opportunities are becoming more and more and actors are getting less and less inhibited by not wanting to cause destruction.

00:10:48:05 - 00:10:53:04
Scott Gee
Who are our biggest adversaries, who are threats in terms of attacks on OTT?

00:10:53:06 - 00:11:21:22
Brian Kaiser
Yeah, I think nation/states for sure are advancing as much as they can, right? And I think that what's interesting again, about this, this area and attacks against operational technology is that with the advancements in SI and superintelligence, it lowers the bar for who can actually attack operational technology in a successful way. So while we do see nation/state actors going after operational technology a lot more frequently, there are also criminal actors that are able to have similar effects.

00:11:21:23 - 00:11:37:17
Brian Kaiser
Now, we talked about how sophistication level is really going to determine what the outcome is at the end of the day. But again, as I can, you know, if you can just spin up SI and then ask it particularly how to do something or what does this mean? It lowers that bar to be able to cause and effect.

00:11:37:19 - 00:11:48:14
Brian Kaiser
I will harp on that again, that these devices are devices that are exposed to the internet. And so that is the number one mitigation in recent attacks is to take those things off the internet.

00:11:48:15 - 00:11:49:17
Scott Gee
Turn it off.

00:11:49:19 - 00:11:50:13
Brian Kaiser
Yes, exactly.

00:11:50:14 - 00:11:51:19
Scott Gee
Block access.

00:11:51:21 - 00:12:15:17
Chad Beebe
Exactly. There - on Brian's point - you know, there's a lot of operational technology that is nice to have. You need to do a assessment in facilities and determine whether you really need to have that. All of these have to be maintained and that's where the difficulty comes with facilities especially, you have multiple different systems. They all run on different firmware and different softwares.

00:12:15:17 - 00:12:33:24
Chad Beebe
And you have to know where those are and keep those all up to date and maintain them. When you take on any of these systems, you have to realize it's not a one time purchase. It's an ongoing commitment to maintain that system. That's kind of I believe the key to cybersecurity here is to make sure that you're maintaining.

00:12:33:24 - 00:12:52:02
Chad Beebe
And I'd say, unfortunately, a lot of our systems kind of go unmaintained on that end of things. I mean, we know that in the United States we have a considerable amount of deferred maintenance. If that's just on the equipment itself, that means it's even more deferred on the back of the house, the firmware and the software as well.

00:12:52:02 - 00:12:56:00
Chad Beebe
So we have to make sure we are committed to keeping those up to date.

00:12:56:02 - 00:13:09:22
Scott Gee
Brian, what practical steps has the FBI seen that healthcare organizations can take to improve OT security and reduce some of these vulnerabilities? What's the balance there? How do we improve security without impacting clinical operations?

00:13:09:24 - 00:13:42:01
Brian Kaiser
Yeah. Chad made a good point about getting two teams to talk. And I think for us as the FBI where we usually see that occur and play out very well are in tabletop exercises. And I think in these tabletop exercises, having everybody in the room that will be responding day of or that will have be part of that issue in the same room, starts to allow people to understand, okay, this person likely plays a role in how I respond to this, and I likely should be talking to them and consulting with them in the event that there is an incident. As the FBI,

00:13:42:03 - 00:14:05:20
Brian Kaiser
one of the things we really push is something called cyber informed engineering. Basically, it's putting a physical control in place so that if an actor were to try to compromise a physical system from thousands of miles away, there's a physical control in place to stop that, right? And that could be in the case of refrigeration, maybe there's a block on how high or how low the actual temperature can go, a physical block, right?

00:14:05:21 - 00:14:26:21
Brian Kaiser
And so those are the things when we talk about the difference between attacking OT and IT is that defenders control that physical space. So as you're building out these systems and as you're thinking about these systems, sit down and really talk through with the people in your company about what is the really critical thing that's going on here, and what is this the criticality of what this device is actually doing?

00:14:26:23 - 00:14:44:15
Brian Kaiser
Because as we digitize more things, that increases the attack surface for actors as well. Things that physically could have happened in the past that weren't digitized as they come on now, that gives the actor the ability to be able to manipulate that system as well. So always be thinking in that mindset that what if this thing were turned against me

00:14:44:15 - 00:14:54:10
Brian Kaiser
and the automation behind this were something that was used by an actor. And those are the things that I think changing that culture and changing that mindset is really where we've seen the biggest improvements.

00:14:54:12 - 00:15:18:05
Scott Gee
You know, Chad, everything used to have a big metal manual switch, right? There was some physical way to control pretty much every system. And a lot of those systems have a lot of those manual backups have gone away now. So what are you seeing on the hospital side for those physical controls that that Bryan talked about? Is that is that something we can do or how difficult is that to implement?

00:15:18:07 - 00:15:49:12
Chad Beebe
Increasingly difficult. But I think a lot of manufacturers are starting to understand this as well. And so they've been working really good with us to install those backup kind of controls is what I'll call them. But yeah, since everything's gone digitized and the whole wave to put operational technology to make it so easy to use and to manipulate and to go back and put in these physical controls isn't as unfortunately, as easy without, you know, you need to upgrade your system or you need to take your system down for a little bit to be able to do that.

00:15:49:12 - 00:16:03:22
Chad Beebe
And these are critical systems. We can't exactly take an air handler down that's serving your operating rooms. I know a lot of manufacturers are taking it seriously. They're really under have understood this and are saying, you know, we all need to be a part of this solution to this, to this problem.

00:16:03:24 - 00:16:07:02
Scott Gee
Excellent points. Brian, any closing thoughts for you?

00:16:07:04 - 00:16:23:21
Brian Kaiser
Yeah, absolutely. I think first and foremost, I think we want to thank everybody in the medical community, right. I think from our side, I'm so in awe of what you guys do, you guys are doing a really important job and really thank you for what you do. I think second off, we at the FBI, we can't do what we do,

00:16:23:21 - 00:16:49:20
Brian Kaiser
we can't pursue the threat the way that we do without the partnerships that we have. And so I'd really encourage you, if you haven't already, to get to know your local FBI field office. I know that they'll provide plenty of resources. If you are considering, tabletops will provide plenty of resources just on the threat itself. We always talk about having that contact prior to an incident so that in the event of an incident when everything's going on, you're not scrambling to try to find that contact.

00:16:50:01 - 00:16:58:23
Brian Kaiser
And so, yeah, I really do believe that these partnerships are what really make our job what it is. And we couldn't do it without you guys. So thank you again.

00:16:59:03 - 00:17:16:11
Scott Gee
Well, thank you, Brian. And I would be remiss if I didn't talk about the incredible relationship the AHA has with the FBI. Thank you very much for joining us today. I'm Scott Gee, the deputy national advisor for Cybersecurity and Risk here at the American Hospital Association. And this has been the Advancing Health podcast.

00:17:16:13 - 00:17:25:02
Tom Haederle
Thanks for listening to Advancing Health. Please subscribe and write us five stars on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts.